Judgments Tracker

Keshan Infotech alleged an Italian editor was scraping its travel content (travelandtourworld.com) for social media use while retaining its logo. The Court granted all four injunctions sought, framed specifically around AI-assisted scraping and content generation.

• Restrained reproduction, translation, adaptation, summarising or paraphrasing of the plaintiff's content, "whether by human authorship or through any AI-assisted or algorithmic process."
• Restrained use of the content as input, training data, or a prompt for any AI model, LLM, automated content generation tool, or web scraper.
• Restrained use of the plaintiff's website for any automated scraping tool, AI system, or algorithmic content-generation mechanism.
• Restrained reproduction in any AI-transformed, paraphrased, or derivative form.
• All four injunctions granted on a prima facie basis, based on the plaint and the respondent's own social media activity.

The Supreme Court set aside an NCLT judgment for relying on AI-"hallucinated" case citations that did not exist in any recognised legal repository — an error that had gone unnoticed even at the NCLAT stage. The Court independently verified the citations and found six were fabricated.

• The Court described the introduction of AI-hallucinated judgments into the legal system as akin to "the release of methyl isocyanate in the province of law and justice: invisible, insidious, and catastrophic by the time anyone notices."
• Held that the hallucinated judgments did not need to be material to the outcome — their mere introduction was sufficient to set aside the decision.
• Adopted a "zero-tolerance" approach, holding both Bar and Bench responsible for verifying the authenticity of authorities relied upon.
• Clarified it was not opposed to AI use in the legal system — AI is a valuable tool, but a "human in the loop" must remain at every stage of adjudication.
• Directed the Bar Council of India to constitute a committee, formulate guiding principles on AI-generated legal material, and prescribe disciplinary consequences for violations.
• Effectively overturned the approach in Gummadi Usha Rani v. Sure Mallikarjuna Rao, where hallucinated citations were treated as possible misconduct rather than grounds to set aside a decision.

ANI sued OpenAI alleging ChatGPT was trained on its news content without permission. The Delhi High Court declined to grant an interim injunction, holding prima facie that storing copyrighted works to train an LLM falls within the fair-dealing exception under Section 52(1)(a) of the Copyright Act — a landmark, though still interim, pro-AI reading of Indian copyright law.

• Applied a two-stage test under Section 52(1)(a): whether the use falls within a specified purpose ("Purpose Test"), and whether the dealing is in fact fair ("Fairness Test") — finding both satisfied at the interim stage.
• Held that "research" under Section 52(1)(a)(i) is not confined to human users, reasoning that research/learning is now also done through AI — bringing LLM training within the provision.
• Emphasised that Section 52 "independently defines the rights/privileges of a user" and must be read broadly — explicitly framing fair dealing as a right, not merely a narrow exception to infringement.
• Found no prima facie market substitution: ANI hadn't shown evidence of lost market share or subscription revenue caused by OpenAI's use, and the Court weighed LLMs' broader societal benefits (education, research, accessibility) as relevant to fairness.
• Clearly distinguished training from output: the ruling protects the training/storage stage prima facie, but does NOT hold that AI-generated outputs can never infringe — questions of memorisation and substantial reproduction in specific outputs remain open.
• Rejected the argument that OpenAI's servers being located outside India puts the conduct beyond Indian copyright law, holding that conventional territoriality concepts cannot be strictly applied to digital technologies.
• Explicitly interim and prima facie — the Court did not conclusively resolve the legality of AI training or grant blanket immunity for AI-generated outputs; the underlying suit continues.

The producers of Taarak Mehta Ka Ooltah Chashmah sought relief against defendants using AI tools to generate and circulate manipulated content exploiting the show's registered characters and brand identity.

• Court recognised that unauthorised creation and dissemination of AI-generated deepfake content featuring fictional characters can infringe both copyright and trademark rights held by the production house.
• Granted an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining the defendants from creating, hosting, publishing, or monetising the infringing content.
• Passed a "John Doe" (Ashok Kumar) order, extending the injunction to unknown and unidentified parties — including websites, e-commerce platforms, and YouTube channels not yet named.

Singer Arijit Singh sued AI companies over unauthorised commercial use of his voice and personality through AI tools. The Court granted an ex parte ad-interim injunction, and the reasoning was subsequently extended to protect several other public figures.

• Court recognised Arijit Singh as a well-known singer with significant goodwill and celebrity status, whose personality traits are entitled to legal protection against third-party exploitation.
• Held that AI tools allowing users to convert any voice into a celebrity's voice without consent violate that celebrity's personality rights — voice is a core part of identity and public image.
• Found that unauthorised commercial use of AI-generated audio/video in a person's name, voice, image, or likeness could seriously harm their career and livelihood, and create risks of deceptive or harmful misuse.
• Following this case, the Delhi and Bombay High Courts granted similar interim injunctions protecting Aishwarya Rai Bachchan, Abhishek Bachchan, Karan Johar, Akkineni Nagarjuna, Hrithik Roshan, Suniel Shetty, and Jaya Bachchan from unauthorised AI-generated content, impersonation, and fake merchandise.

A case involving explicit AI-generated deepfake imagery. The Court treated the content as an infringement of privacy, dignity, and reputation, and ordered major platforms to take it down immediately.

• Court ordered social media platforms, websites, and search engines to immediately remove the objectionable, explicit AI-generated deepfake material.
• Major intermediaries — including Google LLC, Meta Platforms, and X Corp — were named as parties to prevent ongoing dissemination.
• Restrained defendants 1–27 (social media accounts and pornographic websites) from uploading or disseminating non-consensual explicit images of the plaintiff.
• Ordered immediate takedown of the specific URLs identified in the plaint by all concerned intermediaries.
• Google confirmed it had de-indexed the identified URLs and agreed to act on future offending links via its takedown webform.
• The Union of India was directed to block access to the listed pornographic websites and ensure the relevant URLs were also blocked at the ISP level.
• Meta and X Corp were directed to disclose, within 15 days, subscriber information for the defendants allegedly responsible for originating and circulating the content.

Petitioners sought directions requiring MeitY to identify and block platforms/apps that facilitate deepfake creation. The Court has been supervising the Government's response, including a dedicated Committee on deepfakes.

• In October 2024, the Court directed the Government to file a status report on its efforts to tackle deepfakes and any committees formed to address the issue.
• MeitY's status report (21 November 2024) disclosed a 2023 'Advisory Group on AI for India-Specific Regulator AI Framework,' a subcommittee on AI governance guidelines, and a newly constituted 'Committee on matters related to the issue of deepfakes' (20 November 2024).
• Petitioners argued that each day's delay in detecting and removing deepfakes causes significant public hardship, and asked that their suggestions be considered by the Committee.
• Court directed the Government to nominate Committee members within a week, examine the petitioners' suggestions alongside comparative regulatory frameworks, and consult intermediaries, telecom providers, deepfake victims, and platforms deploying deepfake technology.
• MeitY was directed to submit its report as expeditiously as possible, preferably by February 2025.

A rogue YouTube channel used deepfake technology to impersonate Anjana Om Kashyap, managing editor of TV Today (Aaj Tak's parent company), fabricating news videos for commercial gain. The case progressed from an interim order to a permanent injunction.

• Initial Interim Order (June 2025): Google LLC directed to disable the infringing channel within 48 hours, and to disclose Basic Subscriber Information and monetisation/revenue details for the channel owner.
• Permanent Injunction (November 2025): Court issued a permanent injunction blocking the channel entirely.
• Establishes a significant precedent against digital impersonation, defamation, and misuse of AI-generated deepfakes targeting journalists and media figures.

A PIL contending that certain AI platforms — with specific focus on the Chinese AI model DeepSeek — pose risks to individual privacy and could be detrimental to India's sovereignty and security.

• Court asked Central Government Standing Counsel to seek instructions from the concerned ministry.
• Petitioner's counsel pointed to an internal Ministry of Finance advisory cautioning government departments against using AI tools like DeepSeek and ChatGPT on official devices, citing risk of sensitive data breaches.

An unwed Christian mother sought sole guardianship of her son without disclosing the father's identity or notifying him, since he had never been involved in the child's life. Lower courts dismissed her application, ruling guardianship could not be granted without making the father a party.

• Supreme Court held that compelling a mother to disclose the father's particulars, where he showed no interest in the child, violates her informational privacy and autonomy.
• Held that in matters concerning children, the best interests of the child are the primary consideration.
• Ruled that procedural requirements under Section 11 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 could be relaxed to protect the mother's privacy and the child's welfare.

A challenge to a Karnataka government order prohibiting female Muslim students from wearing a hijab in schools and colleges, citing "unity, equality, and public order." The Karnataka High Court had upheld the order, ruling the students' curtailed rights were derivative rather than substantive fundamental rights.

• Supreme Court delivered a split verdict: Justice Hemant Gupta upheld the government order, reasoning it reinforced equality and only regulated conduct during school hours.
• Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia held the order unconstitutional, finding that requiring a girl to remove her hijab at the school gate invades her privacy and dignity.
• Justice Dhulia maintained that privacy and dignity rights are inalienable and carried by the person even inside the classroom.

Facebook India's Vice President was summoned by a Delhi Legislative Assembly Committee investigating the platform's role in spreading hate speech during the 2020 Delhi riots. He challenged the summons, arguing it violated his rights to freedom of speech (including the right to silence) and privacy.

• Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the mere issuance of a summons did not violate constitutional rights.
• Recognised that legislative committees' power to summon individuals is an extension of the legislature's functions.
• Held that the right to privacy cannot be expanded to include a right to refuse to appear before a committee for a lawfully sought deposition.
• Clarified that the witness could still decline to answer specific questions beyond the scope of the inquiry during actual testimony.

In a property inheritance dispute, the defendants sought a court order compelling the plaintiff to undergo a DNA test to disprove his claimed biological relationship with the deceased couple. The trial court refused; the High Court reversed and ordered the test.

• Supreme Court set aside the High Court order, holding that an individual cannot be compelled to take a DNA test against their wish, as it infringes privacy and personal liberty.
• Held that DNA is unique, sensitive information, and such tests should only be ordered where there is an "eminent need" satisfying the test of proportionality.
• Noted that since Indian law favours the presumption of legitimacy, a DNA test should not be used to cause "bastardization" or social stigma where other evidence is available.

A five-judge bench addressed whether information relating to Supreme Court judges — including assets and correspondence on judicial appointments — could be disclosed under the RTI Act, after the CPIO rejected several requests citing fiduciary and privacy exemptions.

• Held that the Office of the Chief Justice of India is a "public authority" under the RTI Act.
• Ruled that judicial independence must be balanced against accountability and the public's right to know.
• Directed that judges' personal asset details should be disclosed, as this does not violate their right to privacy.
• Ordered that information about third parties (e.g. candidates for judicial appointment) be examined case-by-case to prevent unwarranted invasion of privacy.

A five-judge bench examined the constitutionality of the Aadhaar Act, in particular whether it created a "surveillance state" and violated the right to privacy, and whether the Act was validly passed as a Money Bill.

• Majority upheld the Act's overall validity, ruling that Aadhaar use for welfare schemes and linking with PAN was constitutional.
• Struck down mandatory Aadhaar linking for bank accounts and SIM cards as disproportionate and violative of the right to privacy.
• Concluded Aadhaar did not create a surveillance state, since only minimal biometric data was collected and kept in "silos" preventing profiling.
• Struck down Section 57, which allowed private companies to require Aadhaar for services, to prevent commercial exploitation of personal data.
• Justice Chandrachud dissented, arguing the entire program was unconstitutional given its Money Bill status and inadequate safeguards for informational privacy and self-determination.

A challenge to a Maharashtra Act imposing strict conditions on dance bars, effectively creating a near-total ban. The Court held the State could ban obscene dances but not impose blanket bans based on a "moral standard" harming bar dancers' livelihoods.

• Struck down several provisions, including the ban on serving alcohol in dance areas and the "good character" licensing requirement, as arbitrary or lacking rational nexus to the Act's purpose.
• Struck down the condition requiring CCTV installation in dance rooms, holding it a total invasion of the privacy of both patrons and dancers under Articles 14, 19 and 21.
• Invoked the concept of "unpopular privacy," emphasising that even socially stigmatised activities are protected from state intrusion into intimate choices and reputation.

A woman was convicted of murdering her newborn, born out of wedlock, based on circumstantial evidence and her silence about the circumstances of her pregnancy and delivery. Lower courts treated her silence and admission of a miscarriage as an indirect admission of guilt.

• Supreme Court overturned the conviction, finding the prosecution failed to establish a biological link between the appellant and the infant found in a pond.
• Held that the right to privacy includes an accused's right to remain silent during trial regarding their personal life.
• Ruled a woman is under no obligation to explain the fate of her pregnancy, and her silence cannot be treated as incriminating.
• Reiterated that privacy encompasses autonomy over bodily and psychological integrity, including reproductive choices, shielded from judicial presumption.

A member of the National Technical Advisory Group on Immunisation challenged COVID-19 vaccine mandates as unconstitutional and sought disclosure of primary clinical trial data.

• Held that bodily integrity and personal autonomy under Article 21 mean no person can be physically forced to be vaccinated.
• Acknowledged public health as a legitimate State aim permitting reasonable, proportionate limitations on individual rights during a pandemic.
• Found vaccine mandates disproportionate given the pandemic's evolving nature at that time, while leaving room for future measures if required.
• On data disclosure, found that trial results were already published per statutory requirements and expert-reviewed, so release of raw primary data was unnecessary.

CBSE bye-laws strictly prohibited candidates from changing their name or their parents' names on certificates after result publication, except to match existing school records.

• Held that the bye-laws imposed an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right to freedom of expression under Article 19.
• Observed that names are foremost indicators of identity, and individuals must be able to control how they are identified in official documents.
• Held that justifications like "administrative efficiency" or "risk of misuse" did not warrant a total bar on changing one's identity expression.
• Drew on Puttaswamy and Navtej Singh Johar to affirm identity as a protected constitutional value, and directed CBSE to amend its bye-laws accordingly.

A nine-judge bench was convened to resolve whether the right to privacy is a fundamental right, specifically scrutinising older precedents (M.P. Sharma, Kharak Singh) that suggested the Constitution did not explicitly protect it.

• Bench unanimously held that privacy is a distinct and independent fundamental right under Article 21 and the freedoms in Part III, overruling earlier restrictive precedent.
• Declared privacy multifaceted — covering the body, mind, intimate choices, and informational autonomy.
• Established a three-fold test for any State intrusion into privacy: legality (existence of a law), need (legitimate state aim), and proportionality (rational nexus between object and means).
• Recognised sexual orientation as an essential facet of privacy, and held the State has a positive duty to protect privacy from both state and non-state actors.

The petitioner sought directions for the ECI to provide draft voter lists in a "searchable" text format to help identify duplicate/fake entries. The ECI refused, citing concerns that searchable data would enable data mining and voter profiling.

• Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling the petitioner could not claim a right to searchable electoral rolls.
• Interpreted "text mode" in the Election Manual as referring to content (excluding photographs) rather than a specific digital/searchable format.
• Held the ECI has the prerogative to decide the publication format, balancing electoral transparency against the constitutional duty to protect voter privacy and prevent misuse of electronic data.

The case addressed whether public functionaries' free speech could be restricted to protect an individual's right to dignity under Article 21, arising from derogatory ministerial remarks against sexual assault victims.

• Majority (4:1) held that grounds for restricting free speech under Article 19(2) are exhaustive, and no new restrictions can be added even to protect dignity.
• Significantly ruled that fundamental rights under Articles 19 and 21 have horizontal application — enforceable against private individuals and non-state actors.
• Justice Nagarathna dissented in part, arguing derogatory official speech should not be protected and that dignity is a right the State must affirmatively defend.

The petitioner challenged police surveillance regulations authorising secret shadowing, periodic inquiries, and nightly domiciliary visits to homes of suspected criminals, arguing they violated freedom of movement and personal liberty.

• Court invalidated the domiciliary visits provision, holding unauthorised intrusion into a person's home violates the sanctity of the home and personal liberty under Article 21.
• Majority upheld other surveillance forms (shadowing), concluding it did not physically impede movement, and held the right to privacy was not then a guaranteed fundamental right.
• A minority opinion recognising privacy as essential to liberty was later vindicated decades on in the Puttaswamy judgment.

An appeal against a rape and criminal intimidation conviction of a minor, where the appellant argued that "two-finger test" medical testimony suggesting the victim was "habituated to sexual intercourse" implied possible consent.

• Held that the two-finger test and its interpretation violate a rape survivor's fundamental right to dignity, privacy, and physical and mental integrity under Article 21.
• Clarified that habituation to sexual intercourse cannot be used to presume consent — every person has the right to refuse sex regardless of sexual history.
• Emphasised survivors are entitled to legal and medical procedures that do not re-traumatise or subject them to cruel, degrading treatment.

Arising from a government investigation into alleged embezzlement and falsified balance sheets, the petitioners challenged search warrants as violating their right to property and the right against compelled self-incrimination under Article 20(3).

• Supreme Court upheld the government's power, ruling search and seizure did not amount to "compelled testimony."
• Held the Constitution's framers did not explicitly recognise a fundamental right to privacy analogous to the U.S. Fourth Amendment.
• Reasoned that since a search warrant is addressed to an officer (not the accused), the accused has no volitional role, so Article 20(3) was not violated.
• This narrow view of privacy — and its conclusion that no inherent right to privacy exists in India — was overruled by the nine-judge bench in Puttaswamy (2017).

Petitions sought an independent investigation into the alleged use of Pegasus spyware on Indian citizens including journalists, doctors, and political figures. The Union of India filed a limited affidavit denying the allegations but refused detailed disclosure, citing national security.

• Held that while the right to privacy is not absolute, any state interference must satisfy the three-fold test of legality, necessity, and proportionality.
• Emphasised that "national security" cannot be used as a "bugbear" to prevent judicial review — the state must specifically plead and prove its security concerns.
• Constituted an independent three-member Technical Committee, overseen by a retired judge, to investigate the allegations and recommend improvements to surveillance and privacy safeguards.

A landmark case recognising the rights of transgender persons to gender identification outside the traditional binary, establishing the "third gender" in Indian law.

• Held that gender identity is a fundamental aspect of life and dignity, and an individual's psychological gender should take primacy over biological sex.
• Drew support from international instruments including the Yogyakarta Principles, extending full constitutional protection under Articles 14, 15, 16, 19, and 21.
• Declared privacy, self-identity, and autonomy fundamental rights of the transgender community under Article 19(1)(a).
• Directed legal recognition of gender self-identification and reservations in education and employment, plus specialised medical and mental health care for challenges like gender dysphoria.

A challenge to Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, which criminalised "unnatural offences" and effectively penalised consensual same-sex relationships between adults, as violating dignity, decisional autonomy and privacy under Article 21.

• Five-judge bench unanimously struck down Section 377 to the extent it criminalised consensual sexual conduct between adults in private.
• Held the State has no legitimate interest in regulating private intimacy between consenting adults, and societal morality cannot override constitutional morality.
• Relied on Puttaswamy to hold that sexual orientation is an innate characteristic and a core attribute of privacy.
• Concluded that intimate relations are an exercise of autonomy and self-determination, entitling the LGBT community to equal protection and non-discrimination.

A PIL challenged Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, following a report revealing widespread procedural lapses in the government's tapping of politicians' phones.

• Held that telephone conversations are an exercise of freedom of speech and expression, and tapping them is a serious invasion of privacy.
• Did not strike down Section 5(2), but held privacy cannot be violated except by a procedure established by law.
• Established detailed guidelines to prevent executive misuse, including requiring authorisation only by high-ranking Home Secretaries and review committees to assess legal compliance.

The Court considered the constitutionality of using neuroscientific techniques — narcoanalysis, polygraph tests, and "brain mapping" (BEAP) — to gather evidence without a subject's consent, argued to violate the right against self-incrimination and mental privacy.

• Held that involuntary administration of such techniques constitutes "testimonial compulsion," violating the constitutional rule against self-incrimination.
• Emphasised that personal autonomy includes the private choice to speak or remain silent, particularly when facing criminal charges.
• Ordered that such tests cannot be administered without valid consent, obtained before a Judicial Magistrate in the presence of legal counsel.

A woman with "mild mental retardation," living in a government welfare institution, was raped and became pregnant. The Chandigarh Administration sought to terminate the pregnancy against her wishes; the High Court authorised the abortion as being in her "best interests."

• Supreme Court stayed the High Court's order, holding a woman's right to reproductive choice — to procreate or abstain — is a fundamental dimension of personal liberty under Article 21.
• Clarified mental retardation is distinct from mental illness and does not automatically strip a woman of her right to consent to or refuse an abortion.
• Held that termination without her consent would be an arbitrary restriction on her privacy, dignity, and bodily integrity.

Multiple petitions sought legal recognition of same-sex marriage, arguing that excluding LGBTQIA+ couples from the Special Marriage Act was discriminatory and violated fundamental rights.

• Five-judge bench unanimously held there is no unqualified fundamental right to marry under the Constitution, and only Parliament can legislate recognition of same-sex marriage.
• Reaffirmed that queer individuals have the right to choose partners, cohabit, and live with dignity.
• A 3:2 majority held the State is under no positive obligation to legally recognise civil unions for same-sex couples.
• Held that declining to expand marriage laws did not, by itself, violate the individual rights to privacy or autonomy.

The Court addressed whether co-operative societies under the Registrar of Co-operative Societies qualify as "public authorities" under the RTI Act, after a society refused a citizen's request for members' financial information.

• Held that co-operative societies are autonomous bodies not falling under "State" (Article 12) or "public authority" (RTI Act) unless substantially financed or controlled by the Government.
• Emphasised that the right to privacy is a sacrosanct facet of Article 21.
• Ruled that disclosure of personal information with no nexus to public activity or interest is not warranted under the RTI Act.
• Affirmed that Section 8(j) of the RTI Act exempts personal data whose disclosure would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy absent clear larger public interest.

A custody and repatriation dispute: a mother brought her child from the US to India for a medical procedure but refused to return him as previously agreed in a travel consent form.

• Court directed the child's return to the US, reaffirming that in custody matters, the child's welfare takes precedence over parents' personal rights.
• Held that a parent cannot be judicially compelled to relocate from one country to another against their wishes, as this would invade their individual autonomy under Article 21.
• The mother was given discretion to decide for herself whether to accompany the child, while the child was ordered repatriated.

The Court considered whether an unmarried woman could obtain an abortion between 20–24 weeks under the MTP Act and Rules, after the Delhi High Court denied her request by interpreting Rule 3B as applying only to married women facing a change in marital status.

• Supreme Court overturned the High Court, holding that excluding unmarried women from safe, legal abortion during this period is discriminatory and unconstitutional.
• Declared that the right to privacy includes "decisional autonomy"—the right to ma ke choices regarding intimate relations and one's own body.
• Ruled a woman's right to reproductive choice flows from personal liberty under Article 21, making her the ultimate decision-maker regarding her pregnancy.
• Directed that the law be interpreted broadly so all women, regardless of marital status, have equal access to abortion services within the statutory window.